On the Privacy of dK-Random Graphs by Horawalavithana, Sameera & Iamnitchi, Adriana
On the Privacy of dK-Random Graphs
Sameera Horawalavithana
University of South Florida
Tampa, FL
sameera1@mail.usf.edu
Adriana Iamnitchi
University of South Florida
Tampa, FL
anda@cse.usf.edu
ABSTRACT
Real social network datasets provide significant benefits for under-
standing phenomena such as information diffusion or network evo-
lution. Yet the privacy risks raised from sharing real graph datasets,
even when stripped of user identity information, are significant. Pre-
vious research shows that many graph anonymization techniques
fail against existing graph de-anonymization attacks. However,
the specific reason for the success of such de-anonymization at-
tacks is yet to be understood. This paper systematically studies the
structural properties of real graphs that make them more vulner-
able to machine learning-based techniques for de-anonymization.
More precisely, we study the boundaries of anonymity based on the
structural properties of real graph datasets in terms of how theirdK-
based anonymized versions resist (or fail) to various types of attacks.
Our experimental results lead to three contributions. First, we iden-
tify the strength of an attacker based on the graph characteristics
of the subset of nodes from which it starts the de-anonymization at-
tack. Second, we quantify the relative effectiveness of dK-series for
graph anonymization. And third, we identify the properties of the
original graph that make it more vulnerable to de-anonymization.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Social graphs serve as mathematical models of network structures
that represent interactions between real-world entities. Such graphs
are oftenmined to uncover insights about the structure and function
of the interactions represented. This substantial scientific value to
the research community comes with risks: the release of such data
may jeopardize the privacy of individuals. The Web-strip [3] and
AOL [1] scandals are textbook examples on breaching the privacy
of individuals by publicly releasing unsanitized data.
Many anonymization methods have been proposed to mitigate
the privacy invasion of individuals from the public release of graph
data [22]. Naive anonymization schemes employ methods to scrub
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identities of nodes without modifying the graph structure. Struc-
tural anonymization methods change the topology of the original
graph while attempting to preserve (at least some) resemblance
with the original graph characteristics [26, 27, 38]. A main research
challenge is to develop a principled understanding of the two con-
flicting goals of preserving privacy and preserving utility at the
release of anonymized graph data.
One approach for preserving utility in anonymized graphs is
to generate graphs with particular characteristics (utility). dK-
graphs [28] are one such class of techniques that generate graphs
with a given degree distribution. The node degree distribution has
been shown to be a defining property for many real graph char-
acteristics [32]. While dK-graphs model topological constraints
systematically, they are known to be less random and more struc-
tured, the higher the d [32]. Significant attention has been invested
in increasing the utility of dK-based graph generation techniques.
What is not well understood, however, is the interplay between the
anonymity guarantees that dK-graphs provide vs. the strength of
the attack and the particularities of the dataset to be anonymized.
This work addresses this very interaction by employing a ma-
chine learning approach to mount de-anonymization attacks on dK
graphs generated from a set of real social graphs. We believe that an
attacker that uses machine learning to mount its attacks is a realistic
attacker in today’s context [43]. Under this machine learning frame-
work, inspired by [41], we set three objectives. First, we plan to
understand what makes an attack more successful. Second, we want
to quantify the power of dK-based graph generation techniques for
providing anonymity. And third, we try to understand what makes
some graph datasets more resilient to de-anonymization attacks in
the specific case of dK-based anonymization techniques.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 out-
lines the related work. The system model to quantify anonymity is
presented in Section 3, while Section 4 describes the characteristics
of the datasets we used in our empirical investigations. Section 5
presents our results. We discuss and summarize our contributions
in Section 6.
2 RELATEDWORK
The availability of auxiliary data helps reveal the true identities of
anonymized individuals, as proven empirically in large privacy vio-
lation incidents [2, 11]. Similarly, in the case of graph deanonymiza-
tion attacks, information from an auxiliary graph is used to re-
identify the nodes in an anonymized graph [30]. The quality of
such an attack is determined by the rate of correct reidentification
of the original nodes in the network. In general, de-anonymization
attacks harness structural characteristics of nodes that are uniquely
distinguishable [22]. Many such attacks can be categorized into
seed-based and seed-free, based on the prior seed knowledge avail-
able to an attacker [22].
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In seed-based attacks, the process of de-anonymization is con-
ducted to re-identify nodes and ties with the support of sybil
nodes [6] or some knownmappings of nodes in an auxiliary graph [19,
20, 23, 29, 45]. The effectiveness of such attacks is influenced by
the quality of the seeds [41].
In seed-free attacks, the problem of de-anonymization is usually
modeled as a graph matching problem. Several research efforts have
proposed statistical models for the re-identification of nodes with-
out relying on seeds, such as the Bayesian model [33] or optimiza-
tion models [17, 18]. Many heuristics were taken into account for
the propagation process of re-identification, exploiting graph char-
acteristics such as degree [12], k-hop neighborhood [48], linkage-
covariance [4], eccentricity [30], or community [31]. However, the
success rate of a de-anonymization process as often reported in the
literature is dependent on the chosen heuristic of the attack, which
is typically designed in knowledge of the anonymization technique.
Comparing the strengths of different anonymization techniques
thus becomes challenging, if not impossible.
Several works proposed theoretical frameworks to examine how
vulnerable or de-anonymizable any (anonymized) graph dataset is,
given its structure [15, 17, 21, 34]. However, some techniques are
based on Erdös-Rènyi (ER) models [34], while others make imprac-
tical assumptions about the seed knowledge [15]. Ji et. al. [21] also
introduced a configurationmodel to quantify the de-anonymizablity
of graph dataset by considering the topological importance of nodes.
Recently, Sharad [41] proposed a general threat model to mea-
sure the quality of a de-anonymization attack which is independent
of the anonymization scheme. He proposed a machine learning
framework to benchmark perturbation-based graph anonymiza-
tion schemes. This framework explores the hidden invariants and
similarities to re-identify nodes in the anonymized graphs [42, 43].
Importantly, this framework can be easily tuned to model various
types of attacks.
Any anonymization scheme is subject to two conflicting forces:
privacy and utility. Shokri et al. [44] used game theory to model
privacy-utility trade-off on solving the optimization problem for
general distortion and differential privacy metrics. Further, this
model has been generalized to analyze the privacy-utility trade-off
in temporal graphs [46]. It has been shown experimentally that
utility is degraded much faster than privacy is achieved [4, 44].
Differential privacy (DP), initially proposed in the context of
databases [8], was also adapted to graph anonymization in con-
junction with dK-graph generators [7, 35, 36, 38, 47]. Differential
privacy techniques enforce levels of statistical noise to the dK-
distribution before generating respective dK-private graphs. Sala et.
al. [38] observe that dK-series are highly sensitive, thus requiring
high level of noise to reach a required level of privacy. Wang et.
al. [47] study this inherent tension as a variable of privacy enforced
by the dK level. They observe that 1K graphs require smaller mag-
nitude of noise to have strong privacy guarantee, while 2K graphs
have weak privacy guarantee at the same level of noise.
In our work, we study the inherent conditions in dK-graphs
that resist (or fail) to general de-anonymization attacks based on
machine learning techniques. To the best of our knowledge, ours is
the first study to analyze the anonymization power of dK-graph
generation techniques and in conjuction with the type of seed
knowledge the attacker has access to.
3 METHODOLOGY
The methodology for measuring the anonymity of dK-random
graphs using machine learning techniques is presented in this sec-
tion. dK-random graphs [28] are synthetic graphs generated such
that they preserve a given degree distribution of size d , where d is
typically a small number. For example, 1K-random graphs preserve
the degree distribution of the original graph, but create a different
graph structure with possibly other graph properties. 2K-random
graphs preserve the co-joint degree distribution, and are shown
to better preserve the characteristics of the original graph than
1K-random graphs [32]. However, 2K-random graphs expose more
structural information than 1K-random graphs (encapsulated in
a larger d), and hence our research questions in this paper: Are
dK-based graph generators appropriate for graph anonymization and
if so, for what values of d , for what types of graphs, and under what
attack conditions?
To answer these questions, we developed a methodology based
on that presented in [41]. We use the same threat model (Section 3.1)
that aims at finding a bijective mapping between nodes in two differ-
ent, already anonymized graphs. Unlike in [41], as anonymization
technique we used dK-graphs, for d equal to 1, 2, and 2.5 (Sec-
tion 3.2). We mount a machine-learning based attack (Section 3.3.2),
in which the algorithm learns the correct mapping between some
pairs of nodes from the two graphs, and estimates the mapping of
the rest of the dataset. In order to represent the nodes in the leaning
algorithms, we used the same feature vector as in [41] (described
in Section 3.3.1).
3.1 The Threat Model
In this scenario, the attacker aims to match (unlabeled) nodes from
two structurally anonymized, undirected graphs. For example, an
attacker has two unlabeled networks of individuals in an organi-
zation that represent the communication patterns (e.g., email) and
friendship information available from an online social network.
Both networks have been anonymized by removing the original
node labels and by perturbing edges. These graphs are structurally
overlapping, in that some individuals are present in both graphs,
even if their identities have been removed, their links are different
and have possibly been perturbed. The attacker’s task is to find
a bijective mapping between the two subsets of nodes in the two
graphs that correspond to the individuals present in both networks.
It has been demonstrated empirically that when more nodes are
common to the two graphs (i.e., the size α of the overlap increases),
more nodes can be identified since the attacker has access to more
side information [16, 41].
3.2 Anonymization via dK-Random Graph
Generation
The dK-series represent a set of descriptive statistic metrics that
capture the original graph structure at multiple levels of detail [38].
Specifically, the dK-series summarizes the structure of a graph
from the degree distribution of a subgraph pattern of size d . Thus,
0K-graphs are random graphs with a given average node degree,
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1K-graphs are random graphs with a given degree distribution, 2K-
graphs are random graphs with a given joint degree distribution,
3K-graphs are random graphs with a given interconnectivity of
triplets of nodes, and so on. Intermediate steps in the series can
be defined, such as the 2.5K graph, which is a relaxed version
of 3K-graphs that reproduces both joint degree distribution and
degree-dependent clustering coefficient [10].
We use three graph generation techniques (for 1K , 2K , and 2.5K ,
respectively) proposed in previous work. 1K-graphs are graphs ran-
domly chosen from the space of graphs with a given degree distri-
bution. To generate them, we used Orbis [28] with dK randomizing
rewiring. The algorithm works by rewiring random pairs of edges
from the original graph in order to preserve the 1K-distribution. As
suggested in [28], we allow a sufficient number of initial isomorphic
rewirings, and then follow a subsequent set of rewirings to verify
that the 1K-series remain intact. This method results in an unbiased
sampling of 1K-graphs with a significant variation of properties,
such as degree-correlations and clustering [32].
The 2K-graphs preserve a given joint degree distribution, includ-
ing the degree correlations. We used dK-targeting d ′K-preserving
rewiring based onMetropolis dynamics as implemented by Gjoka et
al. [10]. 2K-graphs are generated by beginning with any 1K-graph
and rewiring edges only if suchmodifications move the graph closer
to 2K-series.
For generating 2.5K graphs we used an improved version of the
Metropolis method (MCMC) proposed in [10]. 2.5K graphs are 2K
graphs that preserve a given clustering coefficient in addition to
the 2K distribution. This method starts by adding triangles to a 2K
graph to reach a clustering coefficient threshold and then destroys
them to recreate the desired joint degree distribution. For generating
these graphs, we chose the parameters to ensure uniform sampling
over the dK-space. (It has been shown experimentally [32] that the
number of dK-swaps required for the MCMC method is O(|E |)).
We limit our study for the dK-spaces to 1K , 2K and 2.5K graphs
because algorithms exist that almost surely sample uniformly at
random elements of the corresponding set of graphs [32]. No such
algorithms are known for steps higher in the series [32].
3.3 Experimental Framework
We assume that the adversary has a sanitized graphGsan that could
be associated with an auxiliary graphGaux for the re-identification
attack. As discussed before, Gsan could be the anonymized ver-
sion of the communication (e.g., email) network, whileGaux is the
friendship network.
In order to model this scenario, we split a real dataset graph
G = (V ,E) into two subgraphs G1 = (V1,E1) and G2 = (V2,E2),
such that V1 ⊂ V , V2 ⊂ V and V1 ∩ V2 = Vα , where Vα , ϕ. The
fraction of the overlap α is measured by the Jaccard coefficient of
two subsets: α = |V1∩V2 ||V1∪V2 | . In the shared subgraph induced by the
nodes in Vα , nodes will preserve their edges with nodes from that
subgraphs but might have different edges to nodes that are part of
V1 −Valpha or part of V2 −Valpha .
In an optimistic scenario, an attacker has access to a part of the
original graph (e.g., G1) as auxiliary data and to an unperturbed
subgraph (e.g., G2) as the sanitized data whose nodes the attacker
wants to re-identify. However, this is unrealistic, since researchers
Figure 1: Graph mining system flow to generate node pairs
with the ground truth of identical and non-identical pairs.
and practitioners are well aware now that without perturbing the
structure of the graph, even with identifiable node and edge at-
tributes removed, there is no anonymity [30]. Hence, in order to
reproduce a realistic scenario, we anonymize bothG1 andG2 graphs
(as depicted in Figure 1). Note that this is a more challenging sce-
nario for the attacker. The (not anonymized) graphsG1 andG2 will
be used as baseline to measure the anonymization power of the
dK-based techniques.
We producedm versions of the anonymized graphs, in order to
increase the dataset used for experimentation. The anonymized
graphs are then split again into two overlapping graphs, maintain-
ing the same values of overlap parameters as above. The resulting
graphs are now the equivalent of the email/friendship networks we
used as example above. The overlap is the knowledge repository
that the attacker uses for de-anonymization [14]. Part of this knowl-
edge will be made available to the machine learning algorithms.
Previous work shows that the larger α , the more successful the
attack. However, the relative success of attacks under different
anonymization schemes is observed to be independent from α [41].
In order to experiment with various strengths of the attack for a set
value of α = 0.2, we build Vα in four different ways: i) as a random
collection of nodes from the original graphG (R); ii) by selecting the
highest degree nodes from G (HD); iii) by building a breadth-first-
search tree starting from a randomly selected node in G (BFS-R);
and iv) by building a breadth-first-search tree starting from the
highest degree node in G (BFS-HD). While other alternatives are
certainly possible, these four approaches cover an important set of
realistic assumptions on the attacker.
3.3.1 Node Signatures. Sincewe are employingmachine learn-
ing techniques to "label" nodes in a graph, we need to represent
the nodes as feature vectors. We define the node u’s features using
its neighborhood degree distribution (NDD). NDD is a vector of
positive integers where NDDqu [k] represents the number of u’s
neighbors at distance q with degree k . The decision of using NDD
is supported by the empirical observation that a large proportion of
nodes in a graph are uniquely distinguishable by their NDD [41].
We employ a binning strategy to capture the aggregate struc-
ture of ego networks which is expected to be robust against edge
perturbation due to anonymization [40]. Thus, we represent the
signature of a node u as the concatenation of the binned version of
NDD1u with the binned version of NDD2u . We bin NDD
q
u by using
a bin size of 50, which was shown empirically [41] to capture the
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high degree variations of large social graphs. For each q, we use 21
bins, which would correspond to a larger node degree of 1050. All
larger values are binned in the last bin.
3.3.2 Random Forest Classification. Note that the nodes in
Gsan ∩Gaux , common to both graphs, can be recognized as being
the same node in the two graphs based on their (anonymized) node
identifier. This is the ground truth against which we measure the
accuracy of the learning algorithms.
We generate examples for the training phase of the deanonymiza-
tion attack by randomly picking node pairs from the sanitized
(Gsan ) and the auxiliary (Gaux ) graphs, respectively. In most cases,
we have an unbalanced dataset, with the degree of imbalance de-
pending on the overlap parameter α , where the majority is non-
identical node pairs. We use reservoir sampling technique [13] to
take ℓ balance sub-samples from the population S , and SMOTE
algorithm as an over-sampling technique for each sub-sample. Each
sample is trained by a forest of 100 random decision tress that al-
lows to learn features. Accuracy is measured on unseen examples
from the same sample space. Gini-index is used as an impurity
measure for the random forest classification. Given the size α and
choice of the overlap, we measure the quality of the classifier on
the task of differentiating two nodes as identical or not. We thus
use 2 ×m × ℓ × 100 decision trees per dK-space for the learning
process in each graph space. Table 2 summarizes the statistics of
the sample population.
Wemeasure the accuracy of the classifier in determiningwhether
a randomly chosen pair of nodes (with one node in Gsan and an-
other in Gaux ) are identical or not. Accuracy is being measured by
the distribution of F1-score, which is the harmonic mean between
the precision and recall of a local classifier.
4 DATA CHARACTERISTICS
Our objective is to quantify the graph-anonymization benefits of
graph generation techniques that preserve the dK distribution. To
this end, we select a number of real network datasets (presented
in Section 4.1) and extract their various dK-distributions. We then
generate random graphs from these dK distributions (as presented
in Section 3.2) to play the roles of auxiliary and sanitized graphs.
Note that a pair of auxiliary and sanitized graph (that is, generated
in a particular dK-space and for a specific degree distribution) are
connected by a fraction α of shared nodes, as presented above.
4.1 Network Datasets
We chose five publicly available datasets that represent real social
networks of various types. fb107 [25] represents social circles of an
ego in Facebook. caGrQc [24] is a co-authorship network between
the authors of papers in general relativity and quantum cosmology.
soc-anybeat [9] is an interaction network available in the Anybeat
online community, which is a public gathering place across the
world. soc-gplus [37] is a follower network from Google+. Finally,
wikinews [37] is a discussion network of Wikipedia pages. Table 1
summarizes properties of these datasets.
4.2 Characteristics of dK-generated Graphs
We confirmed that them = 4 instances of dK-generated graphs for
every set of parameters are distinct.We also measured the structural
distance between the original graph and the generated graphs. For
this, we used D-measure [39], a dissimilarity metric between 0 and
1 that quantifies the topological differences based on network node
dispersion (NND). A low D-measure (≈ 0) suggests that graphs
have the same distance distribution, the same NND and the same
β-centrality vector [39]. Non-zero D-measure indicates graphs are
non-isomorphic.
Figure 2 shows the average distance between each of the real
networks and its corresponding dK-generated graph in each of the
dK spaces we consider. The plot suggests the generated networks
are relatively close to the original dataset for sparser graphs (e.g.,
for the soc-anybeat dataset the average D-measure is 0.325, while
for fb107, the average D-measure is 0.415). This observation is
supported by intuition, as sparse graphs tend to have lower node
degrees, thus relatively few opportunities for rewiring to lead to
significantly different topology.
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Figure 2: Average structural distance between the original
network and a dK-generated network using D-measure [39].
The structural distance D-measure is calculated between the
original network and 4 different instances of its correspond-
ing dK-random graphs and the average value is reported,
along with the confidence intervals
5 EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We focus our experimental evaluation on measuring the strength of
an attacker, understanding the dK-space vulnerability for various d
values, and identifying the inherent properties of graphs that resist
(or fail) a de-anonymization attack.
5.1 The Strength of the Attacker
We ask what type of information would help most an attacker under
the threat model we consider. Intuitively, it is not only the size of
the subgraph that the attacker has access to that matters (i.e., the
seed knowledge base), but also the "quality" of the subgraph: for
example, a disjoint set of low degree nodes (which would be the
case of a randomly chosen set of nodes from a power-law graph)
carries much less structural information than a connected subgraph
of the same number of nodes.
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Table 1: Graph properties of the real network datasets. All graphs are undirected. density (d¯) is the fraction of all possible edges,
transitivity (C) is the fraction of triangles of all possible triangle in the network while the clustering (C¯) is the average local
clustering coefficients of the nodes. degree-assortativity (r )measures the similarity of relations depending on the associated
node degree. avg-path-length (κ) depicts the average shortest path length between any pairs of nodes and degree-1 represents
the percentage of nodes in the network with degree exactly 1.
Network |N | |E | d¯ C C¯ r κ degree-1 (%)
fb107 1034 26749 0.1000 0.2534 0.5264 0.4316 2.9517 1.45
caGrQc 5242 14496 0.0011 0.3621 0.5295 0.6592 3.8047 22.83
soc-anybeat 12645 49132 0.0006 0.0073 0.2037 -0.1234 3.1715 49.51
soc-gplus 23628 39194 0.0001 0.0012 0.1741 -0.3885 4.0277 69.16
wikinews 25042 68679 0.0002 0.0001 0.1133 -0.2544 2.9666 33.52
Table 2: Basic statistics of generated node pairs over dK-
spaces under the overlap choices of Random (R), High De-
gree (HD) and BFS-trees (rooted in the highest degree node
BFS-HD and, respectively, a random node, BFS-R). We gen-
erated a total of ≈ 1 billion identical and non-identical node
pairs over three dK-spaces of the five real social network
datasets, and took 364K balanced samples.
Network No. of node pairs (millions) ℓR HD BFS–HD BFS–R
fb107
1k 0.85 0.84 0.88 0.88 12800
2k 0.85 0.84 0.88 0.89 12800
2.5k 0.86 0.85 0.88 0.89 12800
caGrQc
1k 2.36 2.30 3.92 3.98 12800
2k 3.10 3.07 4.96 3.75 12800
2.5k 3.13 3.07 4.96 5.00 12800
soc-anybeat
1k 10.95 10.85 24.35 26.06 32000
2k 10.65 12.60 24.50 26.20 32000
2.5k 11.18 13.56 24.55 26.20 32000
soc-gplus
1k 10.55 11.53 45.04 43.47 32000
2k 12.33 11.40 45.06 49.80 32000
2.5k 12.56 10.40 45.06 49.80 32000
wikinews
1k 23.58 23.16 46.80 46.67 32000
2k 22.63 25.16 46.87 46.72 32000
2.5k 21.55 25.43 46.87 46.72 32000
Figure 3 shows the performance of the classifier on re-identifying
identical nodes over different dK-spaces and different overlap sub-
graph topologies. When the overlap is a strongly connected neigh-
borhood, more nodes are re-identified accurately. As an example,
when the nodes are part of an BFS-Tree (red and purple colors in
the plot), they are more vulnerable to re-identification.
We analyzed the structural properties of the Gsan /Gaux graphs
to explain this phenomenon. Before discussing our observations,
we note that the Gsan and Gaux graphs generated as part of our
methodology are structurally dependent on the choice of overlap,
because they are subgraphs of the dK-graph biased by the choice
of the overlap. Consequently, a higher density overlap choice (e.g.,
BFS-based) will likely lead to a higher density Gsan /Gaux graphs.
We compute the density and average transitivity over the 80 sample
graphs generated for each dK-space by grouping the less vulnera-
ble graphs (according to Figure 3) and the more vulnerable graphs
together. We found that density and transitivity are positively cor-
related with the levels of vulnerability. That is, the mean density
of dK-graphs with an overlap with weakly connected nodes (i.e.,
R or HD) is always lower than the dK-graphs with an overlap of
strongly connected neighborhood (i.e., generated by a BFS tree)
and also less vulnerable to re-identification.
At the same time, we notice that across alldK-spaces, the average
density remains constant (e.g., 0.012 for R/HD-based dK-graphs and
0.018 for BFS-based dK-graphs). We believe this is due to the fact
that density is highly constrained by degree distribution which is
preserved in all dK-spaces. Not the same happens with transitivity
across dK-spaces. Higher dK-spaces preserve the connectivity of
d-subgraphs (d ≥ 2) that, in turn, preserve the local clustering.
Hence, it appears that attackers benefit from a higher clustering
coefficient. Also, for sparser graphs, transitivity is a telling metric
for quantifying the strength of an attack: a connected neighborhood
which has a relatively high transitivity can putmore nodes in danger
in a sparse graph (see the BFS-R plots in Figures 3g–3o).
5.2 dK-space Vulnerability
Our second objective is to evaluate the relative power of dK-based
graph generation techniques for anonymization. Figures 5 presents
the accuracy of re-identification across dK-spaces. As baseline,
we also include the results of classifiers on the non-anonymized
original graph, denoted by "GS". As expected, the re-identification
of nodes in GS is always better than for the "anonymized" dK-space
graphs. This clearly shows there is some anonymization power
in the dK graph-generation techniques. Also expected, there is a
clear increase in the classifier accuracy of classifiers towards higher
dK-spaces (Figures 5i-5t). In general, the 1K-space is the stronger
anonymization approach, as it leads to the poorest re-identification.
This confirms the tradeoff between utility and anonymity, since
1K-graphs maintain the lowest utility.
However, this transition of vulnerability between dK spaces
is not significant for the networks of fb107 (Figures 5a-5d) and
caGrQc (Figures 5e-5h). These graphs are denser than the others.
We reason that even a weak attack is helped by graph density,
compensating thus for a stronger anonymization approach. This
is independently supported by Sharad [41] who observed that the
properties of dense graphs are more resilient to edge perturbation,
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Figure 3: Accuracy of prediction of identical pairs over dif-
ferent dK spaces. Graph properties of density (d¯), assortativ-
ity (r ), and transitivity (C) are averaged over 8 subgraphs per
dK-space that are associated with the given overlap.
and thus more structural knowledge is preserved in the anonymized
graph topology.
We also notice some unexpected cases: 1K-space tends to bemore
vulnerable than their counterparts 2K and 2.5K in sparse graphs
with the BFS-HD overlap (Figures 5k,5o and 5s). In order to un-
derstand this behavior, we analyze the properties of the connected
neighborhood, especially the proportion of nodes with degree one
(Figure 4). This is because nodes with low degree have less struc-
tural information, thus they are more difficult to re-identify [17].
We observe that the proportion of degree-1 nodes in the overlap
has a strong negative correlation with the accuracy of the classifier
in dK levels. As an example, soc-anybeat has an average 20% of
degree-1 nodes in the overlap in the 1K-space and 99% in 2K and
2.5K spaces (Figure 4b). 1K-space turns out to be more vulnerable
to the re-identification attack than 2K and 2.5K spaces (Figure 5k).
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Figure 4: Average percentage of nodes with degree 1 in the
overlap subgraph across dK-spaces (including GS). The over-
laps are averaged over 8 sample instances in each dK space
for two overlap strategies: HD (highest-degree nodes) (a) and
BFS rooted in the highest degree node (b). Figure also shows
the confidence intervals of average measurements.
5.3 Properties of Vulnerable Graphs
In this section we are asking: What makes some graph datasets
more vulnerable to attacks than others? In order to isolate the graph
datasets (asmuch as possible, given ourmethodology, see discussion
in Summary section) from the threat model, we focus on only two
choices of the attacker knowledge base, namely the BFS-HD and
HD overlaps. Because the overlap subgraphs in these two cases
are deterministically generated, the Gsan and Gaux graphs more
accurately represent the structural properties of the original dataset.
For example, the fb107 original graph has density = 0.1 (as shown in
Table 1) and the corresponding generated dK graphs approximate
it by a mean error of 0.01 under the overlap choice of BFS-HD
(as shown in Figure 3). Similarly, the degree assortativity in the
original graph is approximated by the generated graphs in 2K and
2.5K spaces with a mean error of 0.03.
Figures 6a–6d show the kernel density estimate (KDE) of the
accuracy of predictions across graphs in each dK-space for the
overlap choice of BFS-HD. We observe that the vulnerability of
the dataset is monotonically increasing with its transitivity in the
2K and 2.5K spaces: the higher the transitivity, the higher the
vulnerability.
For the graphs generated by constraining the overlapping sub-
graphs to high degree nodes, we preserve the assortativity of the
original dataset in the 2K and 2.5K spaces. Figure 6e–6h shows
that, consistently across all dK-spaces, soc-gplus is the most vul-
nerable dataset while the caGrQc is the least. As Table 3 shows,
soc-gplus has the lowest degree assortativity (r = −0.53), while
caGrQc has the largest (r = 0.6592). Moreover, the relative order in
vulnerability is preserved across all datasets with regard to degree
assortativity. We believe that degree assortativity is a telling sign
for the vulnerability of the original dataset under the HD overlap
construction scenario because of the ways nodes are represented
as feature vectors. Basically, for a high degree node, given that the
degree assortativity is negative, most of its neighbors will be low
degree. This likely means that all these low degree neighbors will
be represented by the first bin in the node signature. The learning
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Figure 5: Accuracy of prediction of identical pairs across dK spaces. GS denotes the instances of original subgraphs at an
attacker’s disposal, which represents a strong attackmodel. Note four overlap strategies; randomselection of nodes (R), highest
degree nodes (HD), while BFS-HD and BFS-R denote the breadth-first-search tree starting from a random selection and the
highest degree based selection respectively.
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(b) BFS-HD: 1K space
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(c) BFS-HD: 2K space
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(d) BFS-HD: 2.5K space
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
F1-score
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 R
an
do
m
 F
or
es
t c
la
ss
ifi
er
s
fb107
caGrQc
soc-anybeat
soc-gplus
wikinews
(e) HD: GS
0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
F1-score
0
2
4
6
8
10
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 R
an
do
m
 F
or
es
t c
la
ss
ifi
er
s
fb107
caGrQc
soc-anybeat
soc-gplus
wikinews
(f) HD: 1K space
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
F1-score
0
2
4
6
8
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 R
an
do
m
 F
or
es
t c
la
ss
ifi
er
s
fb107
caGrQc
soc-anybeat
soc-gplus
wikinews
(g) HD: 2K space
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(h) HD: 2.5K space
Figure 6: Kernel Density Estimate (KDE) of the accuracy of predictions over identical pairs across several graphs. Results are
presented in each dK-space (including GS) under the overlap choices of breadth-first-search tree starting from a degree based
selection (BFS-HD) and High-Degree (HD).
algorithm is thus likely to have seen many examples of values for
the first bin, and thus it can easily recognize a node with a distinc-
tive, unique signature (identified by the very first bin). We observe
the same relative order in GS, supported by the same observation
related to assortativity.
6 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSIONS
We investigate empirically the power of dK-series for structural
graph anonymization. The main contribution of this paper lies
in the questions it answers empirically. Specifically, we evaluate
the relative benefits of dK-random graphs for providing graph
anonymity under a generalized attack supported by machine learn-
ing techniques. We quantify the strength of the attacker based
on the structural graph properties of the knowledge it has access
to in the training phase. Finally, we discover some of the struc-
tural graph properties that makes a dataset more vulnerable to
de-anonymization attacks. To reach these conclusions, we imple-
mented and augmented an experimental framework previously
proposed in the literature [41].
Starting from five real datasets that represent social graphs from
different contexts, we discover the following. First, we empirically
measure the benefits of dK-based anonymization over the original
datasets. For the very same attack scenario, the nodes of the origi-
nal dataset (stripped of node identities) can be re-identified with
the median accuracy of 83%, compared to 74% for a 1K-random
graph, 79% for a 2K-random graph, and 77% for a 2.5K-random
graph generated from the respective degree distributions of the
original graph. Albeit limited to a small set of examples, this result
is telling, as degree distribution is one of the main utility metrics
in graph generation (and anonymization), thus of potential interest
for related work, such as differential privacy [38, 47]. As well un-
derstood, 1K graphs are (usually) less vulnerable than 2K and 2.5K
graphs, under the accepted utility-anonymity tradeoff rule.
Second, we show that if the attacker starts with seed knowledge
in the form of a subgraph with higher density and higher transi-
tivity, re-identification is more potent. On the other hand, a seed
knowledge database that includes high degree nodes that are not
strongly connected is less enabling.
Third, we discover that the tradeoff utility-anonymity is not al-
ways maintained: in particular cases, both utility and anonymity are
lost, and this is due to the exploits of topology with less structural
information by an attack. In other words, there is some defensive
power in any graph depending on the amount of structural infor-
mation exploited by an attack. As an example, it’s relatively hard
to de-anonymize degree one nodes solely based on structural infor-
mation [17]. When a large proportion of such nodes exists in any
dK graph, it’s still difficult to de-anonymize the majority.
Fourth, we identified low (negative) degree assortativity as a ca-
nary for the vulnerability to the specific de-anonymization attacks
we employed.
This work has some caveats that we plan to address in future
work. First, our empirical analysis is limited to five real datasets.
We would like to extend this to gain more confidence on our obser-
vations. Second, our methodology allows for a blurred line between
measuring the strength of the attacker and characterizing the origi-
nal dataset. This is because the way we calibrate the strength of the
attacker—by determining the topological structure that connects
nodes that may be visible to the attacker as part of the training
set—influences the topology of the sample graphs for testing. While
we attempted to isolate the characterization of the two, we plan to
improve our experimental framework to eliminate potential biases.
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We also would like to extend our work to other graph generation
models (e.g., exponential random graph models [5]), and compare
the relative anonymization power with dK models, especially re-
lated to more sophisticated attribute disclosure attacks.
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